We examine the response of Medicare Advantage contracts to published quality ratings. We identify the effect of star ratings on premiums using a regression discontinuity design that exploits plausibly random variation around rating thresholds. We find that 3, 3.5, and 4-star contracts 
Introduction
The role of Medicare Advantage (MA) plans in the provision of health insurance to Medicare beneficiaries has grown substantially. Between 2003 and 2014, the share of Medicare eligible individuals in an MA health plan increased from 13.7% to 30%.
1 To better inform enrollees of MA quality, in 2007, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) introduced a five-star rating system that provided a rating of one to five stars to each MA contract -a private organization that administers potentially many differentiated plans -in each of five quality domains.
2 For the 2009 enrollment period, CMS began aggregating the domain level quality scores into an overall star rating for each MA contract in which each plan offered by a contract would display the contract's quality star rating.
Since in 2012, contracts have been incentivized to earn high quality star ratings through star-dependent reimbursement and bonus schemes.
Early studies on the effects of the star rating program focus on the informational benefits to
Medicare beneficiaries. To this end, the program has been found to have a relatively small positive effect on beneficiary choice, with heterogeneous effects across star ratings (Reid et al., 2013; Darden & McCarthy, forthcoming) . However, one area thus far overlooked concerns the supply-side response to MA star ratings, where a natural consequence of the star rating program could be for contracts to adjust premiums and other plan characteristics in response to published quality ratings.
3 Indeed, while the quality star program is often presented as a potential information shock to enrollees, the program could also serve as an information shock to health insurance contracts, better informing them of competitor quality and better informing contracts of their own signal of quality to the market. For example, learning that its plans have the highest quality star rating in a market in 2009, a contract may choose to price out its quality advantage in 2010 by raising plan premiums. Conversely, a relatively low-rated contract may lower its 2010 premium in response to its 2009 quality star rating. More generally, the extent to which policy may cause health insurance companies to adjust premiums is a central question in health and public economics.
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The current paper provides a comprehensive analysis of 2010 premium adjustments to the 2009 publication of MA contract quality stars. We investigate the specific mechanisms by which contracts can adjust their premiums in response to their quality ratings, and we calculate the corresponding welfare effects. We adopt a regression discontinuity (RD) design that exploits plausibly random variation around 2009 star thresholds, allowing us to separately identify the effect of reported quality on price 1 Kaiser Family Foundation MA Update, available at http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-factsheet/.
2 For example, one domain on which contracts were rated was "Helping You Stay Healthy." 3 Preliminary evidence of a supply-side response to the publication of MA quality stars was found in Darden & McCarthy (forthcoming) , albeit with a restricted sample of contract/plan/county/year observations. 4 For example, see Pauly et al. (2014) on the effects of the Affordable Care Act on individual insurance premiums.
from the overall relationship between quality and price. Our data on contract/plan market shares, reported contract quality, plan premiums, and other plan characteristics come from several publicly available sources. Our results suggest strong premium adjustments following the 2009 star rating program, with average to above average star-rated contracts significantly increasing premiums from 2009 to 2010. When we conduct our analysis at the contract level, we find that 3, 3.5, and 4-star contracts increase their average premiums across existing plans by $33.60, $29.30, $31.85, respectively, relative to contracts with 2009 ratings just below the respective threshold values. At the plan level, we estimate mean increases of $19.40, $41.99, and $31.52 for 3, 3.5, and 4-star contract/plans, respectively. These effects are sizable compared to overall average premium increases of between $9 and $15. The results are also broadly consistent across a range of sensitivity analyses, including consideration of alternative bandwidths, falsification tests with counter-factual threshold values, and the exclusion of market-level covariates.
While an MA contract may directly adjust its plans' premiums in response to quality stars, the contract may also adjust the mix of plans it offers within a market (county). For example, in response to the published star ratings, a contract could alter the number of zero-premium plans; adjust the number of plans that include Medicare Part D coverage; change the drug deductible in plans that offer part D coverage; or add/drop plans entirely. Indeed, our data show that nearly all of the regional variation in plan premiums is due to selection of plan offerings by contracts, as opposed to contracts charging different premiums in different areas of the country. We find that contracts just above the Overall, our results suggest that the star rating program in 2009 may have caused low quality contracts to drop plans while generating large premium increases among contracts receiving 3-star ratings and above. Adopting the consumer welfare calculations used in Town & Liu (2003) and Maruyama (2011) , our estimated increases in premiums imply a reduction in consumer surplus of over $250 million among those beneficiaries enrolled in the relevant plans. To the extent that higher quality plans are replacing low quality plans at reasonable premium levels, plan entry and exit behaviors induced by the star-rating program may partially offset this welfare loss; however, given the number of new plans estimated to have entered the market due to the star ratings, such offsets are likely relatively small (Maruyama, 2011) .
In what follows, we discuss the institutional details of Medicare Advantage and the recent star rating program in Section 2. The data and methods are discussed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
We present our results in Section 5, with a series of robustness checks discussed in Section 6. Section 7 examines the potential mechanisms underlying our estimated premium adjustments, and Section 8 summarizes the welfare effects associated with our estimated premium increases. The final section concludes. the first two years of the overall contract star rating program and the years in which all contracts, including those offering prescription drug coverage, were rated based on the same underlying quality metrics.
Institutional Background
The literature on the MA quality rating initiatives has generally focused on the enrollment effects.
Recently, Reid et al. (2013) find large effects of increases in star-ratings on enrollment that are homogeneous across the reported quality distribution, but results from that paper fail to disentangle the effects of quality from quality reporting on enrollment. Attempting to disentangle these effects, Darden & McCarthy (forthcoming) find heterogeneous effects of the quality star rating program on MA plan enrollment in 2009 and no significant effect in 2010. At the plan level, they find that a marginally higher rated contract at the lower end of the quality distribution (e.g., a 3 as compared to 2. 10 See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of our dataset and specific links. 11 CMS suppresses enrollment counts for contract/plans with 10 or fewer enrollees, but we keep these observations and impute enrollment. The Service Area files are needed because the enrollment files do not account for migration. For example, it is possible for the enrollment file to contain a positive enrollment record for a contract/plan in a county even if that contract is not approved to operate in the county. See Appendix C for futher details.
Our enrollment data is available monthly; however, there is little variation in enrollments across months due to the nature of the open enrollment process at the end of each calendar year. Furthermore, all other variables of interest are specific to a calendar year. Therefore, we take the average enrollment of each plan across months in a given year. The resulting unit of observation is the contract/plan/county/year. Our analysis focuses only on health maintenance organizations (HMO), local and regional preferred provider organizations (PPO), and private fee-for-service (PFFS) contracts.
We exclude all special needs plans and employer/union-specific plans (also known as 800-series plans), and we drop all observations that pertain to United States Territories and Outlying Areas. Our final sample includes 247,978 contract/plan/county/years. 
Methodology
Since star ratings are assigned to contracts (rather than specific plans operating within a contract), 
where q c denotes the contract's star rating in 2009, X cm denotes other contract characteristics, W m denotes 2010 market-level data on the age, race, and education profile of a given county, and ε cmk is an error term independently distributed across characteristics and markets. 13 Given our focus on premiums, our plan characteristics of interest consist of the average premium and the proportion of the contract's plans (in the same county) charging a $0 premium.
14 The CMS quality rating system relies on a continuous summary score between 1 and 5 which is rounded to the nearest half. A contract with a 2.24 summary score is therefore rounded down to a 2-star rating, while a contract with a 2.26 summary score is rounded up to a 2.5-star rating. Intuitively, these two contracts are essentially identical in quality but received different quality ratings. We propose to exploit the nature of this rating system using a regression discontinuity (RD) design. 15 More formally, denote by R c the underlying summary score, byR the threshold summary score at which a new star rating is achieved (e.g.,R = 2.25 when considering the 2.5 star rating), and byR c = R c −R the amount of improvement necessary to achieve an incremental improvement in rating. We then limit our analysis to contracts with summary scores within a pre-specified bandwidth, h, around each respective threshold value,R. For example, to analyze the impact of improving from 2.0 to 2.5 stars, the sample is restricted to contracts with summary scores of 2.25 ±h.
To implement our approach, we specify plan/contract quality as follows:
where γ 2 is the main parameter of interest. Incorporating this RD framework into equation (1), and adopting a linear functional form for f (.), yields the final regression equation
where W m and X cm are as discussed previously. Our baseline analysis estimates equation 3 using ordinary least squares with a bandwidth of h = 0.125. We consider alternative bandwidths in Section 13 We cluster standard errors by contract; however, the results are qualitatively unchanged when clustering standard errors at the county level.
14 The overall plan type (e.g., HMO versus PPO) is typically contract-specific and therefore does not vary across plans within the same contract.
15 See Imbens & Lemieux (2008) for a detailed discussion of the RD design and its application in economics. This is the case in Table 2 , where we see small decreases in average premiums among 2.5 and 4-star contracts with small increases in premiums among 3 and 3.5-star contracts (relative to contracts with one-half star lower ratings). Note that, in order to better reflect the premium charged to a given enrollee in a specific contract, our analysis of average premiums at the contract level excludes plans with 10 or fewer enrollments.
Results

Average Premiums at the Contract Level
16 Our analysis at the plan-level makes no such exclusion.
Table 2
The OLS results say little about the specific effects of an increase in reported quality on premiums.
To address this question directly, Table 3 contracts receiving a 2.5-star rating showed no statistically significant increase in premiums. By virtue of the RD design and the nature of the CMS star rating program, we argue that these estimates can be interpreted as the causal effect of a one-half star increase in quality ratings separate from the quality of the contract itself. For example, 3.5-star contracts of comparable "true" quality to 3-star contracts were able to increase their premiums on average $29 per month. Looking purely at sample averages, all other contracts receiving a 3.5-star rating in 2009 increased their premiums by an average of $12, while 3-star contracts falling just below the 3.25 threshold increased their premiums by just over $3.
We provide extensive robustness and sensitivity analyses for these results in Section 6. Table 3 5.2 Premiums at the Plan Level 6 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
The appropriateness of our proposed RD design depends critically on whether contracts can sufficiently adjust their summary scores. Intuitively, it is unlikely that contracts can manipulate their scores because the star ratings are calculated based on data two or three years prior to the current enrollment period. Contracts would therefore not have the opportunity to manipulate other observable plan characteristics in response to their same-year star ratings. To test this formally, McCrary (2008) proposes a test of discontinuity in the distribution of summary scores around the threshold values.
The resulting t-statistics range from 0.15 to 0.96, suggesting no evidence of a discontinuity in the running variable at any of the threshold values. In the remainder of this section, we investigate the sensitivity of our results along several other dimensions, including: 1) bandwidth selection; 2) inclusion of covariates; and 3) falsification test with counter-factual threshold values.
Choice of Bandwidth
The choice of bandwidth is a common area of concern in the RD literature (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010) . To assess the sensitivity of our results to the choice of bandwidth, we replicated the local linear regression analysis from Tables 3 and 4 for alternative bandwidths ranging from 0.1 to 0.25 in increments of 0.005. The results for mean plan premiums at the contract level (Table 3) are illustrated in Figure 1 , where each graph presents the estimated star-rating coefficient,γ 2 , along with the upper and lower 95% confidence bounds. Similar results for plan-level premium adjustments are presented in Figure 2 . In general, our results are consistent across a range of alternative bandwidths. 
Inclusion of Covariates
The RD literature generally advises against including covariates in a standard RD design (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010) . The intuition for this advice is as follows: if treatment assignment is random within the relevant bandwidth, then the covariates should also be randomly assigned to the treated and control groups. However, in our setting, purely randomized quality scores at the contract level would not necessarily imply randomization in county-level variables. As such, we argue that county-level covariates belong in our analysis in order to control for geographic variation influencing contract location and plan offerings.
Nonetheless, we assess the sensitivity of our analysis to the exclusion of these covariates by estimating a more traditional RD model with right-hand side variables presented in equation 2. We estimate the effect of a one-half star increase in quality ratings with a triangular kernel and our preferred bandwidth of h = 0.125. The results, summarized in Table 8 , are generally consistent with our initial findings in Tables 3 and 4 , where we again see large increases in average premiums among 3, 3.5, and 4-star contracts relative to contracts just below the respective star-rating thresholds. One exception is the estimated effect on individual plan premiums for 4-star versus 3.5-star contracts presented in the bottom right of Table 8 . In this case, unlike the estimates in Table 4 , we find no significant increase in premiums among 4-star contracts along with a reduction in the magnitude of the estimated effect. This is perhaps not surprising given the location of higher rated contracts throughout the country, where 4-star contracts are more concentrated in specific geographic areas relative to lower star-rated contracts. Table 8 6
.3 Falsification Tests
Finally, it is possible that the observed jumps at threshold values of 2.25, 2.75, etc. are driven more by specific contracts that happen to fall above or below the threshold versus the star rating system itself.
As a test, we therefore considered a series of counter-factual threshold values above and below the true threshold values. Intuitively, we should not see any jumps in premiums around these thresholds. Figure 3 presents the results of this analysis for mean premiums at the contract/county level, where we estimated the effects just as we did for Figure 1 and 
Mechanisms for Premium Adjustment
Comparing our contract-level (Table 3) and plan-level (Table 4) analysis, we see larger premium increases at the plan level for 3.5-star contracts and smaller increases at the plan level for 3-star contracts. These results suggest that increases in average premiums at the contract level do not arise solely from increases in premiums of the same plans from 2009 to 2010. Rather, the results suggest that contracts also alter their plan mix from one year to the next (e.g., dropping plans within a contract, introducing new plans under the same contract, or expanding plans to new counties). higher rated contracts were relatively less likely to enter into new markets. Collectively, the exit and 17 The 1.5-star contracts that stayed in the market from 2009 to 2010 also had a marginally higher star rating in 2010. As such, there are no 1.5-star contracts remaining in 2010 (see Table 1 ).
entry figures reflect larger turnover in plan offerings among lower rated contracts relative to higher rated contracts. This is perhaps expected as higher rated contracts may be more deliberate in their market entry/exit decisions and less likely to quickly cycle through new plans from one year to the next. Table 5 7.1 Analysis of Plan Exit The results of our RD analysis of plan exit are summarized in Table 6 . The top panel presents results for all plans, while the remaining panels present results for plans with $0 premiums and plans with positive premiums, respectively. Overall, we see that 2.5-star contracts are significantly less likely to exit markets than 2-star contracts of similar overall quality. Relative to 2.5-star contracts, 3-star contracts show no significant differences in exit behaviors, but they are significantly more likely to drop their $0 premium plans and less likely to drop positive premium plans. Somewhat surprisingly, contracts receiving a 3.5-star rating are more likely to drop plans overall; however, from the middle panel of Table 6 , we see that this result is entirely driven by 3.5-star contracts dropping their $0 premium plans. Finally, 4-star contracts are significantly less likely to exit overall, particularly for their positive premium plans.
18 Table 6 7.2 Analysis of Plan Entry An important and relatively unique aspect of the MA market concerns the distinction between plan and contract-level decisions. Specifically, contracts must obtain CMS approval in order to be offered in a given county; however, conditional on receiving CMS approval, the decision of which plan(s) to offer in a county is relatively less regulated. As a result, we argue that the fixed costs of entry are primarily incurred at the contract level while the plan-level entry/exit decisions are based on the variable profits per enrollee (i.e., regardless of market share). With regard to plan entry, this unique CMS approval process alleviates many of the traditional econometric issues surrounding multiple equilibria or endogeneity of other players' actions in models of market entry with incomplete information (Berry & Reiss, 2007; Bajari et al., 2010; Su, 2012) . Conditional on plan characteristics, our entry analysis therefore need only consider variable cost shifters and should be largely independent of the number or type of competing plans in the county.
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The full set of plans available to a contract in a given market m is identified by taking all plans offered under that contract across the entire state in the same year. All such plans are therefore considered "eligible" to be operated in any given county, and the contract must choose which of those plans to offer in each county, where y c(j)m = 1 indicates that the plan was added to the county (under that contract) in 2010, and y c(j)m = 0 indicates that the plan was not offered. As with our analysis of plan exit, we estimate the entry-equivalent to equation 4 using a standard linear probability model, with entry considered as a function of 2010 county and plan characteristics as well as 2009 contract quality as in equation 2. Table 7 summarizes the results of our RD analysis for plan entry. Note that these results only apply to markets in which the contracts previously operated (i.e., we do not consider the contract-level 18 The robustness of our plan exit results to bandwidth selection is summarized in Appendix D. The overall results (top panel of Table 6 ) at the 2.75 threshold appear relatively sensitive to bandwidth selection, with the statistical significance, magnitude, and sign of the point estimates changing within bandwidths from 0.1 to 0.2. In terms of hypothesis testing, we interpret this as evidence in favor of the null that the star rating has no effect on plan exit at the 2.75 threshold. As such, the qualitative findings from our point estimates in Table 6 are unchanged.
19 Results are robust when we weaken this assumption and allow predicted 2010 market shares to influence entry behaviors. The results are excluded for brevity but available upon request. entry decisions and instead focus specifically on the plan-level entry of pre-existing contracts). The RD results indicate that a one-half star improvement for 3 or 3.5-star contracts makes them significantly more likely to expand their plans into new markets. The bottom panels of Table 7 further reveal that the increase in probability of plan entry occurs for the positive premium plans, with 3.5-star contracts significantly less likely to enter new markets with their $0 premium plans. Table 7 8 Welfare Effects
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To examine the welfare effects of our estimated premium increases in Section 5, we follow Town & Liu (2003) and Maruyama (2011) in estimating a standard Berry-type model of plan choice based on market-level data (Berry, 1994) . Specifically, let the utility of individual i from selecting Medicare option c(j) in market area m be given as
where δ c(j)m and ξ c(j)m represent the mean level of utility derived from observed and unobserved contract-plan-market area characteristics, respectively. We include in δ c(j)m observed characteristics at the contract and plan level, including premiums, plan type (HMO, PPO, or PFFS), and the underlying summary score of the contract. Similar to Town & Liu (2003) , we partition the set of Medicare options into two groups: 1) MA plans that offer prescription drug coverage (MA-PD plans); and 2) MA plans that do not offer prescription drug coverage (MA-Only). Traditional Medicare FFS is taken as our outside option.
In addition to the i.i.d. extreme value error ic(j)m , individual preferences are allowed to vary through group dummies ζ ig . This nested logit structure relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption and allows for differential substitution patterns between nests. The nesting parameter, σ, captures the within-group correlation of utility levels.
Following Berry (1994) and others, the parameters in equation 5 can be estimated using marketlevel data on the relative share of MA plans. Specifically, our estimation equation is as follows:
where x c(j)m denotes observed plan/contract characteristics, and ξ c(j)m denotes the mean utility derived from unobserved plan characteristics. We estimate the parameters of equation 6 using two-stage least squares (2SLS) due to the endogeneity of within-group shares, S c(j)m|g , and plan premiums, F c(j) .
We take as instruments the number of contracts operating in a county, the number of hospitals in a county, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for hospitals in a county (based on discharges), and the number of physicians in the county. The results of this regression are presented in Appendix D.
With estimates of the mean observed utility,δ c(j)m , and the within-group correlation,σ, estimated monthly consumer surplus for a representative MA beneficiary is then derived as follows (Manski & McFadden, 1981; Town & Liu, 2003; Maruyama, 2011) :
Our results yield an estimated $120 reduction in yearly consumer surplus per beneficiary for every $10 increase in premiums (all else equal). In 2010, there were approximately 1,080,000 beneficiaries enrolled in a 3, 3.5, or 4-star MA plan with a summary score just above the relevant threshold value.
Assuming a $20 increase in premiums from 2009 to 2010 (the smallest estimated effect in Tables 3 and   4 ), this yields a total reduction in consumer surplus of approximately $259 million.
Discussion
The potential supply-side response of MA contracts to the CMS quality rating system is critical both from a policy perspective as well as a consumer welfare perspective. If contracts can take advantage of improved quality scores by increasing premiums (holding the contract's true quality constant), then this suggests a lack of competitiveness in the MA market with contracts raising prices without any true improvement in quality. Building on the initial results of Darden & McCarthy (forthcoming), the current paper finds strong evidence of such premium increases among average to above average star-rated contracts.
Based on the results in Section 5 and the range of sensitivity analyses in Section 6, we conclude that the increases in premiums for 3-star versus 2.5-star contracts (the 2.75 threshold) as well as 3.5-star versus 3-star contracts (the 3.25 threshold) are not due to chance but are instead reflective of a true increase in premiums following an increase in reported quality. Meanwhile, we find no consistent changes in premiums for 2.5 relative to 2-star contracts. We find some initial evidence for increases in premiums among 4-star contracts relative to 3.5-star contracts; however, this finding is sensitive to bandwidth specification, and the effect does not persist in our falsification tests. Plan-level results for 4-star rated contracts are also sensitive to the inclusion of market-level covariates, There are likely several reasons for a contract to increase 2010 premiums in response to its prioryear quality ratings. One natural reason is pure rent extraction -contracts may seek to capitalize on their high reported quality by charging a higher price to its existing customers. However, contracts may also increase premiums in order to better curb adverse selection. In this case, contracts of higher reported quality but comparable true quality may want to price-out certain customers from the market, particularly if sicker beneficiaries are more likely to make decisions based in-part on the quality ratings. With market level data, we cannot empirically identify either of these effects individually. Nonetheless, our results generally suggest that the perceived benefits of the star rating program in terms of beneficiary decision-making are at least partially offset by the supply-side response of higher premiums.
The star rating system consists of five domains, with the names of each domain, the underlying metrics in each domain, and the data sources for each metric changing over the years. The metrics and relevant domains for 2009 are listed in Table 9 . Table 9 Although the domains and individual metrics changed from year to year, the way in which overall star ratings were calculated was consistent across years. The calculations follow in five steps, as described 5. Overall Part C star ratings are then calculated by rounding the overall summary score to the nearest half-star value.
We do not observe the i-Factors in the data. We therefore replicated the CMS methodology, ultimately matching the overall star ratings for 98.8% and 98.5% of the plans in 2009 and 2010, respectively. As discussed in the text, plans for which we were unable to replicate star ratings were dropped from the analysis. Note also that star ratings are based on data from at least the previous calendar year and sometimes further back depending on ease of access from CMS. New plans therefore do not have a star rating available, nor was a star rating for such plans provided to beneficiaries. Tables 10 and 11 Similarly, the high variance and low variance thresholds were 1.3462 and 1.0362, respectively.
Table 10 and 11
The calculations for each contract in Table 10 are discussed individually below:
1. Contract H0150: With a mean star value of 2.583 and a variance of 0.879, the contract received an i-Factor of 0 (due to a low mean), which provided an overall summary score of 2.583 and a star rating of 2.5.
2. Contract H0151: With a mean star value of 2.667 and a variance of 0.8, the contract received an i-Factor of 0 (again from a low mean), which provided an overall summary score of 2.667 and a star rating of 2.5, just 0.083 points away from receiving a 3-star rating.
3. Contract H1558: With a mean star value of 3.967 and a variance of 1.275, the contract received an i-Factor of 0.3 (high mean and medium variance), which provided an overall summary score of 4.267, just 0.0167 above the 4.25 threshold required to round up to a 4.5-star rating.
4. Contract H0755: With a mean star value of 3.5278 and a variance of 1.285, the contract received an i-Factor of 0.1 (relatively high mean and medium variance), which provided an overall summary score of 3.6278 and a star rating of 3.5.
5. Contract H1230: With a mean star value of 3.694 and a variance of 1.018, the contract received an i-Factor of 0.4 (high mean and low variance), which provided an overall summary score of 4.094 and a star rating of 4.0.
C Appendix C: Data
Our analysis merges publicly available data from several sources. As our starting point, we merge all contract/plans that are specific to an employer or union-only group (these are also known as the "800-series plans"). While the decision to eliminate these plans reduces our sample by 17,051,609
(11,988,547) observations, these contract/plans are not available to the public and are not our primary For the few counties that are sub-divided by SSA, we aggregate to the county level. focus. Next, we drop the 231,655 (159,439) observations of special needs plans. Finally, we drop the observations that did not merge perfectly between the CMS enrollment files and the service area files.
These reflect either contracts with positive enrollment in a month/year/county that were not approved to operate in that county (due to migration) or contracts that were approved to operate in a county but had no corresponding enrollment record. Our final sample size for 2009 is 1, 422,887 (841,790) contract id/plan id/county/month. We also collect hospital discharge data from the annual Hospital
Cost Reporting Information System (HCRIS) as well as CMS benchmark rates and average FFS costs by county. Figure 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the plan-level RD analysis to our bandwidth selection. As should be the case, the figure closely follows that of the contract-level analysis from Figure 1 . Generally, Figure   2 suggests that the findings from the point estimates in Table 4 are relatively persistent across alternative bandwidths (provided the bandwidths are sufficiently narrow and include a sufficient number of contracts).
Figure 2
Figures 4 and 5 present similar graphs for the analysis of plan exit and plan entry, respectively.
The figures generally support the robustness of the point estimates in Tables 6 and 7 to our bandwidth selection. Our analysis of plan exit and entry at the 2.75 threshold (2.5 versus 3-star contracts) is one possible exception, with the statistical significance, magnitude, and sign of the point estimates changing within bandwidths from 0.1 to 0.2. In terms of hypothesis testing, we interpret this as evidence in favor of the null that the star rating has no effect on plan exit or entry at the 2.75 threshold. As such, the qualitative findings from our point estimates in Table 6 are unchanged, while the overall findings from our analysis of plan entry (top panel in in Table 7 ) are less definitive among 3.0 relative to 2.5-star rated contracts.
Figures 4 and 5
D.2 Welfare Analysis
The results of estimating equation 6 with OLS and 2SLS are presented in Table 12 along with the first-stage results for the 2SLS estimator. a OLS regression of the 2010 mean characteristics on the relevant 2009 mean characteristic and star ratings. Regressions estimated separately for each star rating, withγ 2 denoting the estimated effect of a one-half star increase in quality ratings. Contract-level averages are based on all plans with more than 10 enrollments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust to clustering at the county level. Additional controls not in the table include county-level variables on the population over 65, population over 85, unemployment rate, percent white, percent black, percent female, regional dummy (south), percent graduating college, and the number of MA plans and contracts in the county, the CMS benchmark payment rate and average FFS cost, and number of physicians in the county, as well as contract-level variables including the number of counties in which the contract operated in 2009, whether the contract operates as an HMO or PPO, and the total number of enrollees under the contract in 2009. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. a Results based on OLS regressions with RD approach and a bandwidth of h = 0.125. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the county level. Results were excluded for the 1.5 and 4.5 star ratings due to an insufficient number of contracts on the lower and upper ends of the 1.75 and 4.25 thresholds, respectively. Regressions estimated at the contract level, with dependent variables measured as the average value of each plan characteristic by contract (excluding plans with 10 or fewer enrollments). Additional controls not in the table include county-level variables on the population over 65, population over 85, unemployment rate, percent white, percent black, percent female, regional dummy (south), percent graduating college, and the number of MA plans and contracts in the county, the CMS benchmark payment rate and average FFS cost, and number of physicians in the county, as well as contract-level variables including the number of counties in which the contract operated in 2009, whether the contract operates as an HMO or PPO, and the total number of enrollees under the contract in 2009. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. a Results based on OLS regressions with RD approach and a bandwidth of h = 0.125. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the county level. Results were excluded for the 1.5 and 4.5 star ratings due to an insufficient number of contracts on the lower and upper ends of the 1.75 and 4.25 thresholds, respectively. Regressions estimated at the plan level for all plans in the dataset. Additional controls not in the table include county-level variables on the population over 65, population over 85, unemployment rate, percent white, percent black, percent female, regional dummy (south), percent graduating college, and the number of MA plans and contracts in the county, the CMS benchmark payment rate and average FFS cost, and number of physicians in the county, as well as the plan's total number of enrollees in 2009 (set to 0 if missing), an indicator variable for missing number of enrollees (¡10 enrollees in the plan), an indicator for HMO or PPO plan type, and the lagged dependent variable. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. a Results based on linear probability model with RD approach and a bandwidth of h = 0.125. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the county level. Results were excluded for the 1.5 and 4.5 star ratings due to an insufficient number of contracts on the lower and upper ends of the 1.75 and 4.25 thresholds, respectively. Additional controls not in the table include county-level variables on the population over 65, population over 85, unemployment rate, percent white, percent black, percent female, regional dummy (south), percent graduating college, and the number of MA plans and contracts in the county, the CMS benchmark payment rate and average FFS cost, and number of physicians in the county, as well as 2009 plan characteristics and enrollment. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. a Results based on linear probability model with RD approach and a bandwidth of h = 0.125. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the county level. Results were excluded for the 1.5 and 4.5 star ratings due to an insufficient number of contracts on the lower and upper ends of the 1.75 and 4.25 thresholds, respectively. Additional controls not in the table include county-level variables on the population over 65, population over 85, unemployment rate, percent white, percent black, percent female, regional dummy (south), percent graduating college, the CMS benchmark payment rate and average FFS cost, and number of physicians in the county, as well as plan characteristics (premium, Part D participation, and HMO versus PPO). * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. a Results based on RD with triangular kernel and a bandwidth of h = 0.125. Results were excluded for the 1.5 and 4.5 star ratings due to an insufficient number of contracts on the lower and upper ends of the 1.75 and 4.25 thresholds, respectively. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. a Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the contract level. In the 2SLS estimation, premium and within group share were instrumented using number of contracts operating in a county, the number of hospitals in a county, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for hospitals in a county (based on discharges), and the number of physicians in the county as instruments. * p<0.1. ** p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
